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CHIPPING AWAY AT WORKPLACE PRIVACY: THE 
IMPLANTATION OF RFID MICROCHIPS AND  
EROSION OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY 
 
Wes Turner*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 1, 2017, a small technology firm in Wisconsin, Three Square 
Market, held a “chip party” where many employees were implanted with 
microchips.1 The program was voluntary, and more than fifty of the firm’s 
eighty employees opted in.2 The chips replace key cards and passwords, 
allowing employees to enter the building, sign into their computers, and 
purchase food with the wave of a hand.3 The microchip is a Radio 
Frequency Identification Device (RFID), which allows one device to 
communicate with another when in close proximity.4 Over the past few 
decades, technological advancements have shifted the employee-employer 
relationship; implanting employees with a microchip represents a new peak 
in this trend. 
 
 
*. J.D. (2019), Washington University in St. Louis. 
1. Trent Gillies, Why Most of Three Square Market's Employees Jumped at the Chance to Wear 
a Microchip, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/11/three-square-
market-ceo-explains-its-employee-microchip-implant.html [https://perma.cc/VF3K-M2QY]. 
2. Maggie Astor, Microchip Implants for Employees? One Company Says Yes, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/microchips-wisconsin-company-
employees.html [https://perma.cc/29BW-BHC2]. 
3. Gillies, supra note 1. 
4. RFID Frequently Asked Question: What is RFID?, RFID JOURNAL, 
https://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/show?49 [https://perma.cc/HVG2-QCYR]. More specifically, 
RFID[] is a generic term for technologies that use radio waves to automatically 
identify people or objects. There are several methods of identification, but the 
most common is to store a serial number that identifies a person or object, and 
perhaps other information, on a microchip that is attached to an antenna (the chip 
and the antenna together are called an RFID transponder or an RFID tag). The 
antenna enables the chip to transmit the identification information to a reader. The 
reader converts the radio waves reflected back from the RFID tag into digital 
information that can then be passed on to computers that can make use of it. 
Id. 
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Although these chips do not have GPS capabilities, Three Square Market 
is designing a chip that does.5 Many companies already use some form of 
GPS and data tracking to monitor employee performance. United Parcel 
Service (UPS), for example, uses a system called “telematics.”6 UPS’s 
telematics system tracks everything. A UPS delivery truck has two hundred 
sensors to track delivery information such as backup speed or seatbelt use. 
Each step along the delivery is tracked, with a supervisor receiving the 
information in real time: route, speed, parking, package retrieval, and even 
time spent buckling the seat belt.7 UPS claims that in 2010 telematics saved 
1.7 million driving miles, 15 million minutes of idling time, and 103,000 
gallons of gas, while allowing the company to eliminate roughly ten percent 
of its vehicles.8 Following this trend, Amazon recently patented a wristband 
to track warehouse employee hand movement and vibrate when an 
employee is reaching in the wrong bin.9 Walmart, not to be outdone, 
recently patented audio surveillance technology to catalog noises at cash 
registers ranging from conversations to “rustling noises.”10 The employers’ 
desire for efficiency gains from monitoring employees is clear: increase 
productivity while automating the supervision required to do so. 
The legal protections for employee privacy concerns from excessive 
monitoring are based on 1980s workplaces and technology—GPS devices 
on company cars and video surveillance in the workplace.11 Advances in 
technology have already pushed the limits of the usefulness of 1980s legal 
protections. Wearable technologies, such as Fitbits and smartwatches, leave 
employees vulnerable to “adverse employment decisions, discrimination, 
 
 
5. Gillies, supra note 1. 
6. Esther Kaplan, The Spy Who Fired Me, HARPER’S MAG. (Mar. 2015), 
https://harpers.org/archive/2015/03/the-spy-who-fired-me/ [https://perma.cc/CTJ8-NW5B]. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Matt Novak, Amazon Patents Wristband to Track Hand Movements of Warehouse 
Employees, GIZMODO (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/amazon-patents-wristband-to-
track-hand-movements-of-war-1822590549 [https://perma.cc/6GZW-8P7X]. 
10. Caroline O'Donovan, Walmart's Newly Patented Technology for Eavesdropping on Workers 
Presents Privacy Concerns, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 11, 2018, 6:05 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/walmart-just-patented-audio-surveillance-
technology-for#.gia8Mn4Vg [https://perma.cc/7NX5-U7GW]. 
11. See infra Sections I.A. and I.C. 
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and invasions of privacy rights.”12 Personal smartphones used for work, 
coupled with workplace productivity and security apps, likely give rise to 
similar problems.13 But an implanted and immovable microchip may take 
these problems to a new extreme. 
Part I of this Note tracks the development of employee privacy rights and 
how these rights have responded to recent changes in technology and work. 
Part II analyzes how microchip implants will likely be treated and makes 
additional policy recommendations. 
 
I. HISTORY 
 
A. Privacy, the Constitution, and the Common Law 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
privacy protection from government searches.14 Often, an individual’s 
expectation of privacy determines the degree of protection accorded by the 
Fourth Amendment.15 For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme 
Court used a two-part inquiry to determine whether the Fourth Amendment 
protected the defendant’s privacy interest.16 The first question is “whether 
the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy.’”17 “The second question is whether the individual's 
 
 
12. Elizabeth A. Brown, The Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health and Fitness 
Data at Work, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 5–6 (2016). 
13. See, e.g., Arias v. Intermex Wire Transfer, L.L.C., No. 1:15-cv-01101-JLT, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 
2017) (discussed infra Section I.D); Kamika S. Shaw, GPS Tracking of Employee Devices: How Much 
is Too Much?, ONLABOR (May 8, 2017), https://onlabor.org/gps-tracking-of-employee-devices-how-
much-is-too-much/ [https://perma.cc/7ARB-EUCQ] (applying the privacy-based car GPS framework to 
smartphone tracking) .  
14. The Fourth Amendment states that 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
15. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353 (1967) (holding that the government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the 
defendant's words in a public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the defendant “justifiably 
relied” and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
16. 442 U.S. 735, 740. 
17. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). 
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subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable,’” that is, whether the individual's expectation is 
objectively reasonable.18 In order to receive the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, there must be an objectively reasonable subjective expectation 
of privacy.19 Accordingly, in Smith, the Court held that individuals have no 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they voluntarily surrender 
to third parties, establishing what is now known as the third-party doctrine.20 
The Supreme Court introduced the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
analysis into the public employment context in O’Connor v. Ortega.21 In 
O’Connor, the Court held that even where the government is acting as an 
employer, the Fourth Amendment may protect government employees from 
searches by their government employer.22 In O’Connor, an employee at a 
public hospital was being investigated for sexually harassing two other 
employees.23 The public employer searched the employee’s office without 
his permission.24 The Court held that the governmental interest in the 
“efficient and proper operation of the workplace” must be balanced against 
the privacy interests of employees in their place of work.25 Thus, the Court 
found that employees have a protectable privacy interest recognized by the 
Fourth Amendment at the workplace, although it provides less protection 
than at home.26 Because Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinet, and 
 
 
18. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). 
19. Id. at 743.  
20. Id. at 743–45. For an explanation of the third-party doctrine, see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case 
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). The future of the third-party doctrine is 
less certain following Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), where the Court held that the 
third-party doctrine at least does not extend to location data given to cell towers through the automatic 
communication between cell phones and cell towers. 
21. 480 U.S. 709, 711–12 (1987). 
22. Id. at 725–26.  
23. Id. at 712. 
24. Id. at 713. 
25. Id. at 719–20. 
26. The Court held that  
Given the societal expectations of privacy in one's place of work . . . , we reject 
the contention made by the Solicitor General and petitioners that public 
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of 
work. Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they 
work for the government instead of a private employer. The operational realities 
of the workplace, however, may make some employees' expectations of privacy 
unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement 
official. Public employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/18
 
 
 
 
TURNER NOTE 
3/31/2020 
 
2020]                     Chipping Away at Workplace Privacy                      279 
 
there was no hospital policy on the subject, Ortega had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his office.27 The Court then 
remanded the case to determine whether the employer’s intrusion was 
reasonable in scope and inception given the expectation of privacy Ortega 
had.28 
Private-sector employees, however, are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; naturally, there is no state action involved when a private 
employer acts. Instead, private-sector employees must rely on either the 
common law or a patchwork of statutory protections to protect their privacy 
interests at work. 
The tort “intrusion upon the seclusion of another” is the “most commonly 
used [tort] to protect employee privacy against excessive employer 
intrusion.”29 Despite O’Connor’s nonbinding precedent, the courts import 
the same basic idea: a determination of reasonable expectation of privacy 
with the goal “to distinguish personal from work-related matters.”30 
However, this tort must also be “highly offensive to a reasonable person,”31 
a higher standard than the public employment cases. Instead of balancing 
privacy expectations with the reasonableness in the inception and scope of 
intrusion, private employment cases turn on privacy expectations and 
whether the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”32  
 
 
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be 
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate 
regulation. 
Id. at 717 (emphasis omitted). 
27. Id. at 718–19. 
28. Id. at 729. 
29. Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond a Brick and Mortar Understanding of State Action: 
The Case for a More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee Privacy in the Workplace, 4 
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 1, 9 (2013). 
30. See Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 
907–08 (2012). 
31. Id. 
32. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that an employee did have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a locker where the employee 
used his own lock and the search was highly offensive). However, because of the nature of the 
employment relationship, a reasonable expectation of privacy is often not found. See, e.g., Terrell v. 
Rowsey, 647 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding the plaintiff did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his vehicle when parked on the employer’s property during work hours). 
Common areas have no expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 
1061–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy under Arizona law when 
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A comparison of two GPS-tracking cases illuminates this difference. In 
Cunningham v. New York Department of Labor, a tracking device was 
placed on a public employee’s car prompted by the concern that the 
employee was submitting false time reports.33 The court first found that GPS 
tracking constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.34 Relying on 
Ortega v. O’Connor, the court also held that the location of a vehicle used 
in the course of employment is entitled to the same degree of privacy as 
personal effects on a desk.35 The court next used the inception-and-scope 
framework from O’Connor and found the search was unreasonable in its 
scope because “[i]t examined much activity with which the State had no 
legitimate concern . . . .”36 Because the car was owned by the employee and 
tracked twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, it was impossible “to 
eliminate all surveillance of private activity” and therefore the surveillance 
exceeded the necessary scope.37  
In Elgin v. St. Louis Coca-Cola Bottling Co, the private employer, in the 
course of investigating a cash shortage, attached a GPS tracking device to a 
company-owned vehicle used by an employee during both work and off-
work hours.38 The company did not tell the employee that a GPS device was 
placed on the vehicle until the investigation had concluded.39 The employee 
brought an invasion-of-privacy claim under Missouri common law.40 The 
court granted summary judgment for the employer.41 The court held that 
because “an automobile's path of travel is, as a matter of law, not [a] secret 
and private subject matter as necessary for a viable invasion of privacy 
claim under Missouri law,” the plaintiff did not have a high enough 
reasonable expectation of privacy to surpass a “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person” standard.42 The court determined that the type of 
 
 
a supervisor followed a woman into the bathroom because, although the stall was private, the area 
immediately outside was a common area). 
33. 997 N.E.2d 468, 470 (N.Y. 2013). 
34. Id. at 471.  
35. Id. at 472.  
36. Id. at 473. 
37. Id. 
38. No. 4:05CV970-DJS, 2005 WL 3050633, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2005). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at *3. 
41. Id. at *4. 
42. Id. at *3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/18
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information obtained by the GPS tracker was limited to the whereabouts of 
the vehicle and was therefore permissible.43 
The limits of both the Fourth Amendment and common-law privacy 
protection are seen with mandatory suspicionless drug testing. The Supreme 
Court recognized in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n the high 
level of expectation of privacy one has in the sample-collection process: 
 
There are few activities in our society more personal or 
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it 
by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function 
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, 
its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as 
well as social custom.44 
 
Nevertheless, the Court held that public employers could still mandate 
drug testing so long as there was a “compelling Government interest.”45 
Following Skinner, despite the high level of expectation of privacy, courts 
of appeals consistently upheld government-mandated drug-testing policies 
by finding compelling justifications.46 
Private-sector employees fared no better. Some plaintiffs were successful 
where the act of observing the urination violated a right to privacy,47 and 
the state of California found suspicionless drug testing where there was no 
legitimate employer interest to be a violation of privacy.48 These cases are, 
 
 
43. Id.; see also Tubbs v. Wynne Transp. Servs. Inc., No. H-06-0360, 2007 WL 1189640, at 
*10–11 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment on the tort claim 
of invasion of privacy finding that Tubbs, who drove employer-owned trucks that were each outfitted 
with a GPS device that transmitted the truck's location to the company, failed to show the objective 
standard of a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
44. 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 
175 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
45. Id. at 633. Although the employer in Skinner was a privately owned railroad, the Court treated 
it as a public employer because its actions were mandated by federal law. Id. at 614-15. 
46. “For example, in all eight reported courts of appeals' decisions in 1989 which followed 
Skinner . . . and involved broad Fourth Amendment challenges to employer drug testing policies, the 
employer prevailed on appeal.” Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting 
Employee Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1018 n.38 
(2006). 
47. See, e.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41, 43–46 (1st Cir. 1988). 
48. Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 631–32 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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however, the exception, and the overwhelming majority of private drug-
testing cases did not find a privacy violation, even where the employer had 
no rational business interest or suspicion.49 
 
B. Statutory Protection 
 
There are a few federal statutory protections against the more egregious 
privacy violations, although most commentators believe that these are 
woefully inadequate.50 Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA), known as the Wiretap Act, governs electronic communications 
in transit and prohibits interception without consent.51 The Wiretap Act’s 
main weakness comes from the “in transit” and “interception” 
requirements.52 Employers do not need to intercept any communications 
when they are stored on employer-owned devices because employees have 
little expectation of privacy.53 
 
 
49. See, e.g., Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992); Horne v. J.W. 
Gibson Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1990); Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 
1998); Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 947 P.2d 846 (Ariz. 1997); Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360 
(Okla. 1994); Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997); Jennings v. Minco Tech. 
Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Roe v. Quality Transp. Servs., 838 P.2d 128 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1992). 
50. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 
105 CAL. L. REV. 735, 750 (2017); Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 
64 S.C. L. REV. 323, 334 (2012); Kara Lyons, Corporate Reputation Management vs. Employee Privacy, 
LAW360 (July 29, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/684280/corporate-reputation-
management-vs-employee-privacy [https://perma.cc/SNR2-ATJL]. 
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). The Wiretap Act defines a violation as when any person 
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication; (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other 
person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to 
intercept any oral communication ...; (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to 
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was 
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in 
violation of this subsection . . .  
Id. 
52. Ajunwa et al., supra note 50, at 749. 
53. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398–99 (4th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, consent is 
considered a viable waiver, and with the employment-at-will doctrine, consent is easily attainable. 
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal 
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (noting the limited negotiation 
power left to the employee under an at-will employment contract). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/18
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Title II of the ECPA, known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 
protects electronic communications held in storage.54 The phrasing of the 
act, however, “belies its age.”55 The Act focuses on authorization to access 
a facility, a concept no longer pertinent with the advent of the internet and 
other technologies. Moreover, the focus on authorization does little, if 
anything, to protect the large majority of workers who are employed-at-
will.56 In practice, every employer has de facto authorization. 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)57 once again fails to adapt 
to the modern workplace. The CFAA prohibits individuals from accessing 
a computer without authorization and thereby obtaining information.58 In 
workplaces where employers provide a computer and where authorization 
is easily obtainable, the CFAA is of little help. 
Employment discrimination statutes may provide some protections 
against discrimination from the misuse of the data legally collected but does 
nothing to hamper the collection of data itself. The Americans with 
Disabilities Amendments Act,59 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,60 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,61 the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act,62 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,63 and the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act64 all protect against employment-
related discrimination resulting from the data collected. The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was designed to 
protect the confidentiality of patients' health information.65 To the extent 
that the data being collected is individually identifiable health information, 
 
 
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018). 
55. Ajunwa et al., supra note 50, at 749. 
56. Id. at 749–50; see generally Kim, supra note 53. 
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)–(h) (2018). 
58. Id. § 1030(a). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018). 
60. Id. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2018). 
62. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013). 
63. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, S. 995, 95th Cong. (1978). 
64. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008). 
65. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996). 
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HIPAA may provide some protection against its misuse and 
dissemination.66 
State laws are more targeted to specifically address employee privacy 
rights. State-law protections, however, vary drastically from state to state. 
Connecticut and California, for example, have very strong protections.67 
Many states, however, provide little or no additional statutory protections 
for employees. Only two states, Delaware and Connecticut, require 
employers to inform their employees that their activities are being 
monitored.68 In the RFID context, a handful of states prohibit the mandatory 
implantation of an RFID microchip as a condition of employment.69 A 
patchwork of state protections, nonetheless, still leads to patches of 
unprotected employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66. The statute defines “individually identifiable health information” as the “subset of health 
information” that 
(1) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or 
health care clearinghouse; and (2) relates to the past, present, or future physical 
or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an 
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care 
to an individual; and (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which 
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the 
individual. 
Id. § 1171(6). 
67. In California, employers cannot eavesdrop on employees’ private telephone conversations 
without consent, or conduct video or audio surveillance in specified areas such as bathrooms or locker 
rooms. CAL. LAB. CODE § 435 (West 2019). California also prohibits the tracking of vehicles without 
consent. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 2019). California additionally outlaws requiring employees 
to undergo the subcutaneous implantation of identification devices. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.7 (West 2019).  
68. Kaplan, supra note 6. 
69. These states include Arkansas, California, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/radio-frequency-identification-rfid-privacy-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/436S-MRD5] (last 
updated Nov. 6, 2018). Legislation is also currently pending in New York. Glenn Bain, State Pol 
Proposes Legislation to Ban Employers from Planting Microchips in Workers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 
21, 2017, 6:14 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/n-y-pol-reveals-bill-ban-employers-
microchipping-workers-article-1.3512050 [https://perma.cc/H3TK-7CR5]. 
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C. Worker Surveillance 
 
Given the little expectation of privacy in the workplace,70 a “highly 
offensive” standard, and no federal statutory prohibitions, private 
employers are able to monitor and surveil employees in the workplace with 
near impunity.71 For example, an employer can video-record or photograph 
employees in plain view at the workplace.72 Hidden cameras, however, may 
give rise to issues when placed in bathrooms or changing rooms,73 and 
surveillance of protected concerted activity is likely a violation of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).74 Even surveillance outside of the 
workplace may be legal if the actions are not impermissibly intrusive. 
Surveillance of activities performed in public or plain sight, for example, is 
almost always permissible.75 Some courts and commentators have argued 
that filing a claim such as worker’s compensation waives any reasonable 
 
 
70. Some scholars have criticized relying on a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test as 
inherently insufficient because it relies on employer policies and practices, rather than existing social 
norms to determine reasonableness. Business practices and the existence of any legitimate business 
concern can be used to undermine an employee’s privacy. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Employee 
Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 226 (1996); Don Mayer, Workplace 
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 625 (1992). 
71. See, e.g., SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 12–17 
(2015) (“This history can be traced through many pivotal points including massive efforts through 
warfare, slavery, globalization, and other forms of colonialism used to control and exploit workers.”). 
72. Smith v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D. Colo. 1991) (placing employee 
under “close observation” at desk was not an invasion of privacy); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. 
Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962). 
73. Compare Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1184 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that employee must prove that she had actually been observed in a state of undress), with 
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Cal. 2009) (holding that placement of cameras can 
be an invasion of privacy). 
74. See, e.g., Danzansky-Goldberg Mem'l Chapels, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 840, 843 (1982). 
75. See, e.g., Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 270–71 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(watching a public school principal to ascertain whether his residence conformed to school board policy 
was not a violation of privacy where he was observed on public streets or highways); Brady v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 652, 657 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (holding surveillance acceptable as to a medical 
leave claim); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (investigating worker’s 
compensation claim when employee was in an area observable by the public is acceptable). 
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expectation of privacy.76 Regardless, trespassing on a person’s home, is 
likely a step too far.77 
The modern workplace, however, uses more advanced forms of 
surveillance than video cameras and photographs in order to monitor 
productivity. According to a survey from the American Management 
Association, “at least 66 percent of U.S. companies monitor their 
employees' internet use, 45 percent log keystrokes, and 43 percent track 
employee emails.”78 One survey “found that more than 50% of 239 large 
corporations surveyed are using ‘nontraditional’ monitoring techniques.”79 
Employers have long tracked the time the employee is engaged with the 
machine, the error rate, or the time per stroke to compare against the 
employee’s prior performance or against average performances.80 Now, 
employers are able to put RFID chips and microphones in employee ID 
badges or hide them in lights.81 Companies collect data on employees’ 
whereabouts and “latency”—length of time in between tasks, length and 
 
 
76. See McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975) (“[O]ne who seeks to 
recover damages for alleged injuries must expect that his claim will be investigated and he waives his 
right of privacy to the extent of a reasonable investigation.”); Daniel P. O’Gorman, Looking Out for 
Your Employees: Employers’ Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion 
of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 212 (2006). This is however not the dominant view. See Beaumont v. 
Basham, 205 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006), for an example of the dominant view that the filing of 
such a claim does not waive an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
77. See, e.g., Ass’n Servs. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Interestingly, gaining 
access to a person’s home through deceit was ruled not to be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 
Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
78. The Rise of Workplace Spying, THE WEEK (July 5, 2015), 
http://theweek.com/articles/564263/rise-workplace-spying [https://perma.cc/232Q-XXQT]. 
79. Rick Wartzman, Workplace Tracking is Growing Fast. Most Workers Don’t Seem Very 
Concerned, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90318167/workplace-
tracking-is-growing-fast-most-workers-dont-seem-very-concerned [https://perma.cc/RM4E-47CN]. 
80. This was topic was addressed as early as 1989. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE 
SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1989) (explaining the history of employers’ 
tracking an employee’s performance as the employee engages with a machine). 
81. The company Enlightened is the biggest seller of this technology. It currently collects data 
from over 350 companies including fifteen percent of Fortune 500 companies. Rebecca Greenfield, New 
Office Sensors Know When You Leave Your Desk, BLOOMBERG (February 14, 2017, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-14/new-office-sensors-know-when-you-leave-
your-desk [https://perma.cc/5Q7V-N7XY]; see also There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of 
the Future, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.economist.com/special-
report/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-the-workplace-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/NQ5U-
D83S]. 
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tone of conversations, and frequency of bathroom breaks.82 The data is then 
used as “people analytics” to increase productivity and make personnel 
decisions.83 At its best, the technology is used to ensure hospital caregivers 
wash their hands84 or to prevent insider trading.85 At its worst, over-
surveillance breeds inhumane proposals such as electrocuting truck drivers 
whose eyes fall off the road for a few seconds86 and creates a workplace 
Panopticon. Ifeoma Ajunwa argues, “Now, with the advent of almost 
ubiquitous network records, browser history retention, phone apps, 
electronic sensors, wearable fitness trackers, thermal sensors, and facial 
recognition systems, there truly could be limitless worker surveillance.”87 
 
D. Bring Your Own Devices and Wearable Technologies 
 
Increasingly, people use their personal mobile phones and laptops for 
work.88 A recent survey found that seventy-two percent of companies in the 
United States already had or planned to have bring-your-own-device 
(BYOD) policies by late 2018.89 The use of a device for both personal and 
 
 
82. See, e.g., Josh Bersin, The Geeks Arrive in HR: People Analytics Is Here, FORBES (Feb. 1, 
2015, 6:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2015/02/01/geeks-arrive-in-hr-people-
analytics-is-here/2/#5c752e0c2902 [https://perma.cc/5KXZ-4RHR]; Ryan Derousseau, The Tech that 
Tracks Your Movements at Work, BBC (June 14, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20170613-
the-tech-that-tracks-your-movements-at-work [https://perma.cc/HVR6-3CE8].  
83. Derousseau, supra note 82.  
84. Id. 
85. Olivia Solon, Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching: Workplace Surveillance Can Track Your 
Every Move, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/workplace-surveillance-big-brother-technology 
[https://perma.cc/3CJ4-GQGB].  
86. This idea was proposed by the Roads Minister of Australia and never gained traction as the 
Transportation Workers Union quickly quashed it. Benedict Brook, Proposal to ‘Electric Shock’ Drowsy 
Truck Drivers in Wake of Fatal Crashes Slammed, NEWS.COM.AU (Jan. 17, 2018, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/proposal-to-electrocute-drowsy-truck-
drivers-in-wake-of-fatal-crashes-slammed/news-story/d69c25f8fe814993848509b6dad40731 
[https://perma.cc/X6GX-XWHP]. 
87. Ajunwa et al., supra note 50, at 743. 
88. For an overview of the rapid rise of bring-your-own-device policies, see Melinda L. 
McLellan, James A. Sherer & Emily R. Fedeles, Wherever You Go, There You Are (With Your Mobile 
Device): Privacy Risks and Legal Complexities Associated with International "Bring Your Own Device" 
Programs, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 12–23 (2015). 
89. Michael Lazar, BYOD Statistics Provide Snapshot of Future, INSIGHT (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.insight.com/en_US/content-and-resources/2017/01182017-byod-statistics-provide-
snapshot-of-future.html [https://perma.cc/5VRK-EC59]. 
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professional purposes blurs the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
analysis.90 Typically, employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
while using employer-owned work devices.91 One likely has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their own home,92 and a lowered one at their office 
desk.93 But as the workplace changes, this distinction is not so sharp. 
Workers telecommute from a home office,94 and one-third of employees are 
required to check work emails outside of work.95 From 2005 to 2012, remote 
working increased seventy-nine percent “and now makes up 2.6 percent of 
the American workforce, or 3.2 million workers.”96 Moreover, a large 
portion of the workforce is now expected to be on call, all but eliminating 
the line between personal time and work time.97  
BYOD policies show how the distinction between work and personal 
devices can lead to difficult questions of privacy rights. For example, Arias 
 
 
90. Emily J. Tewes, Comment, #Privatesphere: Can Privacy Laws Adequately Protect 
Employees Amidst the Complexities of the Modern Employment Relationship?, 57 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 287, 306–07 (2017). 
91. See, e.g., Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 
974676, at *2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (finding that an employee had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in work emails on a work computer); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100–01 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (finding similarly that an employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in work email on 
work computer). But see Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663–34 (N.J. 2010) 
(holding that emails from a password protected personal account used on a company computer between 
plaintiff and attorney were protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
92. Telecommuting has already blurred the distinction between home and work. Some software 
used to monitor freelance workers at home is extremely intrusive. For example, Upwork monitors 
freelance employees by taking random screenshots of their desktop to send to the person hiring to ensure 
they are not wasting time. Sue Shellenbarger, Work at Home? Your Employer May Be Watching, WALL 
ST. J., (July 30, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121737022605394845 
[https://perma.cc/G57T-KA3W]. 
93. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
94. Kaplan, supra note 6. 
95. Jim Harter et al., Most U.S. Workers See Upside to Staying Connected to Work, GALLUP 
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://news.gallup.com/poll/168794/workers-upside-staying-connected-
work.aspx?g_source=work%20email&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles [https://perma.cc/SAJ5-
ZQNM]. 
96. Alina Tugend, It's Unclearly Defined, but Telecommuting Is Fast on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/your-money/when-working-in-your-pajamas-is-
more-productive.html [https://perma.cc/BRD4-ZTMK]. 
97. Kaplan, supra note 6; see also Ilya Marritz, In New Economy, Minimum-Wage Workers Are 
Always on Call, WNYC (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/new-economy-many-employers-
expect-open-availability [https://perma.cc/8HND-MMW3]. 
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v. Intermex Wire Transfer98 is one of the first challenges to GPS tracking of 
an employee’s smartphone: 
 
Intermex required all employees to install an app, Xora, 
which contained a GPS function that allowed the company 
to track the employee’s whereabouts through the 
employee’s phone. The plaintiff asked her supervisor 
whether [] actions off the job would also be tracked. The 
supervisor told her off duty whereabouts would be tracked, 
and confirmed that the plaintiff was expected to keep her 
phone on 24/7 to answer any calls from clients. The 
plaintiff told her supervisor she was fine with the tracking 
while she was on duty, but expressed discomfort with being 
tracked when she was off duty and during the weekends. . . 
. Ultimately, the plaintiff decided to uninstall the app, [] 
was reprimanded for doing so[,] . . . [and] was fired [a few 
weeks later]. Arias sued Intermex for invasion of privacy, 
violations of the California Constitution and California 
Labor Code, wrongful violation, and unfair business 
practices, among other things. The case ultimately settled 
out of court.99  
 
Even in a state with stronger employee protections such as California, the 
inherent weakness embedded in an employment-at-will regime easily 
undermines employee rights; because an employee can be fired for any 
reason so long as it is not illegal, the employee must overcome the difficult 
burden of proving retaliation. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to fit the O’Connor 
framework into the modern workplace. In City of Ontario v. Quon, a public 
employee claimed he had a reasonable expectation of privacy while using 
an employer-owned cell phone that he was permitted to use for personal 
purposes.100 The Court did not determine whether the employee had a 
 
 
98. No. 1:15-cv-01101-JLT, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (dismissing case because of an out-
of-court settlement). 
99. Shaw, supra note 13. 
100. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764 (2010). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy and instead assumed arguendo that he 
did.101 The Court then held that because “the search was motivated by a 
legitimate work-related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope,” 
the search was still reasonable.102 Although the Court assumed the employee 
had a privacy interest—an interest strengthened by the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches—it has already 
signaled that so long as the search is rationally related to work and not 
excessive in scope, a search will still be held to be reasonable.103 
A close analog to BYODs and RFID microchips is the rise of 
employment-related wearable wellness devices such as Fitbits.104 The past 
few years have seen an explosion of this technology in the workplace.105 
Employers are strongly incentivized to lower health insurance costs, and 
wearable technologies are the perfect tool.106 Fitbit offers the ability for 
employers to see how active employees are. Fitbit’s website promises that 
employers in the program can “monitor individual, team and company-wide 
progress.”107 The benefits of adopting a Fitbit Wellness program, according 
to the site, include the ability to “create a culture of well-being,” “increase 
 
 
101. Id. The Court declined to answer this question because, “A broad holding concerning 
employees' privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have 
implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.” Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Brown, supra note 12. 
105. Jane Wild, Wearables in the Workplace and the Dangers of Staff Surveillance, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/089c0d00-d739-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e 
[https://perma.cc/9VGC-UC2M]; see also Brown, supra note 12, at 14–17 (discussing the rise of the 
wearable technology industry generally and in the workplace specifically). 
106. For example, Appirio, a Bay Area startup, negotiated a $300,000 discount on its $5 million 
insurance costs by agreeing to share employee health data with its insurer and showing that the staff's 
health was improving, and BP offers their employees a cut of $1200 for using a Fitbit and logging 
sufficient activity. Adam Satariano, Wear This Device So the Boss Knows You're Losing Weight, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-21/wear-
this-device-so-the-boss-knows-you-re-losing-weight [https://perma.cc/FB6L-PA2F]. Due to the 
proliferation of these programs, John Hancock Insurance offered customers up to a fifteen percent 
discount on their insurance rates in exchange for healthful activity as measured by the Fitbits the 
customers agreed to wear. Tara Siegel Bernard, Giving Out Private Data for Discount in Insurance, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/your-money/giving-out-private-data-
for-discount-in-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/5SW6-SMCP].  
107. Fitbit Group Health, IAML SERVICES, http://iamlservices.com/partner/fitbit/ 
[https://perma.cc/UW3J-73ZQ] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
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employee productivity,” “improve employee health status,” and “boost 
acquisition and retention.”108 
The collected health data, however, can also be used to track 
employees.109 In deciding which of two candidates to promote, an employer 
could review each candidate's sleep pattern,110 physical activity, or calorie 
intake, and decide based at least in part on this data.111 IBM recently filed a 
patent for “a system wedding currently ubiquitous drones with cameras and 
biometric sensors that could dispatch caffeine to flagging employees,” with 
nothing prohibiting the collection of the data used for employee analytics.112 
Elizabeth Brown concludes that the collection of health data can easily be 
used to discriminate and affect employment decisions with little legal 
recourse; employees likely do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in this data, and federal statutes offer no additional protection.113 
 
 
 
 
108. Id. 
109. For example, a company was able to track the intimate details of employees’ pregnancies by 
encouraging them to use a phone app to monitor their health and then paying the app developers to 
access all of the details. Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate Data with Your 
Boss?, WASH. POST (April 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/tracking-your-pregnancy-an-app-may-be-
more-public-than-you-think/?utm_term=.b4bbc077d205 [https://perma.cc/JGU6-G2CR]. 
110. Already a health insurance company monitors the use of equipment by sleep apnea patients. 
Marshall Allen, You Snooze, You Lose: Insurers Make the Old Adage Literally True, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 
21, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/you-snooze-you-lose-insurers-make-the-old-
adage-literally-true [https://perma.cc/X5FS-ELGZ]. 
111. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 118-19 (2014) (“Impulsivity and 
the inability to delay gratification—both of which might be inferred from one's exercise habits—
correlate with alcohol and drug abuse, disordered eating behavior, cigarette smoking, higher credit-card 
debt, and lower credit scores. Lack of sleep—which a Fitbit tracks—has been linked to poor 
psychological well-being, health problems, poor cognitive performance, and negative emotions such as 
anger, depression, sadness, and fear. Such information could tip the scales for or against” a job 
candidate) (citations omitted); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, That's Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, 
Discrimination and the FTC's Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 350–52 (2014) (describing 
potential discrimination resulting from use of health-related Big Data); Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting 
Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2122 (2015) (noting potential for 
discrimination when access opens to private information). 
112. Camilla Hodgson, IBM Looks for Caffeine Buzz with Coffee Delivery Drones, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/51a801b2-a464-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b 
[https://perma.cc/ZFK3-WC4Z]. 
113. Brown, supra note 12, at 48. 
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II. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
 
Put in this context, Three Square Market’s use of implanted RFID 
microchips is not shocking. An implanted microchip is the natural 
combination of three major workforce trends: increased monitoring and 
surveillance; decreased expectation of privacy in devices used for work; and 
wearable technology that tracks health information. 
Similar to the drug-testing cases, employee privacy claims against 
microchip implants have an uphill battle. First, there is generally little 
expectation of privacy in employer-owned sensor-generated data.114 And 
similar to BYOD policies, the line between use for work and personal is not 
bright. Because a microchip implant can collect data at all hours and cannot 
readily be turned off or removed, where one’s expectation of privacy should 
begin and end is difficult to ascertain for workers perpetually on call or 
expected to always check emails.115 
The Court’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis is outdated. It 
relies on a spatial distinction between work life and private life that no 
longer exists.116 In O’Connor, the Supreme Court stated that the “essential” 
first step is to “delineate the boundaries of the workplace context.”117 This 
perpetuates the fallacy that work life can be successfully segregated from 
private life. The autonomy of a “private sphere” no longer exists.118  
Nonetheless, some courts may find a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in microchip-generated data during off-work hours. As the Supreme Court 
pointed out in Skinner, there are things with which an employer has no 
legitimate interest.119 While employees can take off a Fitbit, an implanted 
RFID microchip is much harder to remove. An employer having access to 
employee heart rates at 2:00 a.m. on a Friday night should be found to 
exceed the legitimate interest delineated by Skinner. 
 
 
114. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 747 (2010). 
115. See Tewes, supra note 90, at 298–99. 
116. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (presuming that it is possible to “delineate 
the boundaries of the workplace context” and suggesting that the boundaries be a threshold 
determination). 
117. Id. 
118. See Tewes, supra note 90, at 305–08. 
119. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
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Finding a reasonable expectation of privacy, however, may still not 
protect employee privacy interests. Following Skinner, courts still upheld 
nearly all mandatory government drug-testing programs, and the private 
sector fared no better.120 Legitimate business reasons will likely always 
trump any expectation of privacy. Moreover, a finding that some data 
collected by a microchip is granted a reasonable expectation of privacy 
would do little to slow down the erosion of privacy rights in other areas such 
as wearable technologies or BYODs.121 
Additionally, the reasonable expectation of privacy is relative to the 
office place. Employer policies and practices can adjust the reasonable 
expectation of privacy. If the use of microchips to make employment 
decisions is regular and known, then an employee will likely be unable to 
assert a violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy.122 
Furthermore, a reasonable expectation of privacy only helps ex post and 
is severely limited by the employment-at-will regime. An individual 
employee can receive damages based on a dignitary harm but has little 
power to bargain over or prevent the injury from occurring. This is partially 
due to employer privacy policies being a “local public good”—where the 
policies affect the entire office workplace.123 One individual likely cannot 
bargain over these privacy concerns, as seen with Arias’ termination.124 
Employees currently only have a few options, all unsatisfactory. If 
employees acquiesce, they have consented and lose a privacy claim; only 
where the monitoring exceeds their consent could they have any reasonable 
claim of a privacy violation. And because of the employment-at-will 
regime, employees are often left with the choice of consent or be terminated. 
An employee who refuses and is terminated suffered no privacy violation 
and any claim rests in a statutory retaliation claim—only where it exists—
rather than in common law dignitary harm. 
Other workplace privacy commentators have proposed some solutions. 
One approach to protect employees’ health data is omnibus federal 
 
 
120. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra Part I.D. 
122. “Employers can easily defeat the threshold element of reasonable expectation to privacy 
through proper planning with prior notice, written consent and practices and procedures.” Tewes, supra 
note 90, at 308–09. 
123. Kim, supra note 46, at 1027. 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
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information privacy laws.125 The European Union's Data Directive has long 
served as a model for this approach; it empowers the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, individual National Data Protection Authorities 
(NDPAs), and various citizens and civil society groups to enforce violations 
of personal data protection.126 This scheme then limits the data collected to 
work-related activities. Having the public and government enforce privacy 
rights allows employees to avoid adverse employment consequences 
because the enforcement actions can occur before the harm is suffered. 
 As Professor Ajunwa points out, however, this type of scheme does 
not necessarily address the difficulty in mandating consent as a condition of 
employment: 
In the United States, such an omnibus protection would 
represent a pyrrhic victory. In the context of at-will 
employment—where there is asymmetrical bargaining 
power between the worker and the employer—standard 
notice and consent mechanisms would merely serve as a 
sanitizing seal of approval for employer surveillance; there 
would be no real chance for dispute by the employee.127 
 
Additionally, limiting collection to work-related activities will not 
mitigate collection of data but rather lead to a broader definition of work-
related activities. As the definition of work continues to expand so too will 
the scope of data likely to be collected. Professor Ajunwa’s idea therefore 
still relies on terms of discernable spatial and temporal workplace 
boundaries. 
Professor Brown persuasively argues that the FTC should require 
sufficient labeling on wearable technologies to inform consumers that their 
health data is being collected.128 Brown notes that required and specific 
labeling on products will make enforcement against wearable-technology 
companies that collect data easier for employees.129 This solution is 
 
 
125. Ajunwa et al., supra note 50, at 743. 
126. See, e.g., Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMM'N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-
development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/know-your-rights/freedoms/protection-
personal-data_en [https://perma.cc/9TDM-CCGV]. 
127. Ajunwa et al., supra note 50, at 774. 
128. Brown, supra note 12, at 43–45. 
129. Id. at 44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/18
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transferable to employer-implanted RFID microchips where employees 
may often not realize the far-reaching data-collection capabilities and the 
expanding reliance on data analytics in employment decisions. Sufficient 
notice would allow employees to make an informed decision and, if the 
employer breaks its own policy, would allow for easier recourse in contract 
law rather than tort. The largest drawback, similar to most protections, is 
that the protections are largely illusory in an employment-at-will system. 
The technical ability to reject a microchip implant can easily be 
overshadowed by the workplace necessity of having a chip; if firms 
structure their workplaces around RFID microchips, the only way to 
function will be with receiving one. And where employees refuse to 
consent, they will simply be terminated or not hired. 
Professor Kim, with drug-testing cases, offers a collectivist, rather than 
individual, approach to address privacy concerns.130 A collectivist approach 
allows employees to address privacy concerns before they suffer a dignitary 
harm, by bargaining over the implantation of new technology.131 Such an 
approach solves the problem presented above where when employees are 
terminated they fail to suffer a cognizable privacy violation—consent or be 
terminated. 
In the sense that privacy is a “local public good” a collectivist approach 
may be the only way to successfully negotiate over its implementation.132 
An individual employee, as shown in Arias, cannot meaningfully bargain 
over a local public good. The employer will simply terminate them. 
Conversely, collective action allows for the cost of bargaining to be evenly 
distributed across the workforce rather than suffered by the brave employee 
who objected. For example, unions shot down the idea of electrocuting truck 
drivers in Australia,133 and a union in Britain forced the Daily Telegraph to 
remove its spying system, OccupEye.134 Stopping short of outright bans on 
 
 
130. Kim, supra note 46. 
131. Id. at 1021. If there is a union with a collective bargaining agreement in place, implantation 
of microchips would likely be a mandatory subject of bargaining, just as mandatory drug testing was. 
See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989). 
132. Kim, supra note 46, at 1027. 
133. Brook, supra note 86. 
134. Ben Quinn & Jasper Jackson, Daily Telegraph to Withdraw Devices Monitoring Time at 
Desk After Criticism, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2016, 4:13 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jan/11/daily-telegraph-to-withdraw-devices-monitoring-
time-at-desk-after-criticism [https://perma.cc/3SFM-M83L].  
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the implantation of microchips or overturning the employment-at-will 
system, a collectivist approach that engages in collective bargaining over 
the implantation of microchips may be the only way for employees to truly 
assert their privacy rights. 
In an employment-at-will regime, employees must assert their privacy 
rights collectively before the implementation of increased workplace 
surveillance. Such an approach is the only way to address the “damned if 
you do, damned if you don’t” conundrum offered by employers: consent or 
be terminated; it is a structure where an employee cannot resist the erosion 
of their fundamental privacy rights until they have already been harmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the workplace rapidly evolves, employers will have more access to 
employee data than ever before. With wearable technologies, BYODs, and 
now implanted microchips, employers can access nearly all gatherable 
information. Employers can make employment decisions based on average 
heart rate or hours of sleep. Employers may be hesitant to provide health 
insurance for employees who regularly visit the doctor or promote those 
who engage in off-duty alcohol consumption. 
Under the current regime, there is very little an employee can do to 
prevent their employer from accessing such personal information. The 
lowered level of reasonable expectation of privacy for all work-related 
activities creates a giant hole in privacy torts, and even finding a reasonable 
expectation of privacy will only prevent the most egregious violations. 
Similarly, the patchwork of federal statutory protections provides little 
aid.135  
In order to protect employee privacy rights, employees should seek a 
collectivist approach. A collectivist approach will not be limited to 
employee privacy protection for the mandatory implantation of microchips 
but will allow employees to assert their rights to privacy in other areas as 
well. A collectivist approach additionally allows employees to bargain over 
its implementation before any adverse employment consequences are 
suffered. Individual resistance over a local public good such as privacy will 
 
 
  
135. See supra Section I.B. 
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often simply lead to termination, as Intermex terminated Arias.136 Instead, a 
collectivist approach allows employees to negotiate over privacy rights.137 
 
 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
137. Kim, supra note 46. 
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